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SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS? A CONFIGURATIONAL
EXAMINATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MECHANISMS
VILMOS F. MISANGYI
The Pennsylvania State University
ABHIJITH G. ACHARYA
Singapore Management University
We conduct an exploratory qualitative comparative case analysis of the S&P 1500
firms with the aim of elaborating theory on how corporate governance mechanisms
work together effectively. To do so, we integrate extant theory and research to specify
the bundle of mechanisms that operate to mitigate the agency problem among publicly
traded corporations and review what previous research has said about how these
mechanisms combine. We then use the fuzzy-set approach to qualitative comparitive
analysis (QCA) to explore the combinations of governance mechanisms that exist
among the S&P 1500 firms that achieve high (and not-high) profitability. Our findings
suggest that high profits result when CEO incentive alignment and monitoring mech-
anisms work together as complements rather than as substitutes. Furthermore, they
show that high profits are obtained when both internal and external monitoring
mechanisms are present. At the same time, however, monitoring mechanisms evi-
dently combine in complex ways such that there may be simultaneity of substitution
and complementarity among and across the various monitoring and control mecha-
nisms. Our findings clearly suggest that the effectiveness of board independence and
CEO non-duality—governance mechanisms widely believed to singularly resolve the
agency problem—depends on how each combine with the other mechanisms in the
governance bundle.
Corporate governance research and practice is
largely guided by the foundational arguments of
“positive agency theory” (e.g., Demsetz, 1983;
Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1983;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and thus has been “most
concerned with describing the governance mecha-
nisms that solve the agency problem” (Eisenhardt,
1989: 59). That is, the concern is with how to con-
strain executives of publicly traded corporations to
run the firms for the shareholders’ benefit. A host of
governance mechanisms have been posited to effec-
tively mitigate the agency problem (for reviews, see
Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Eisenhardt,
1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997): the alignment of
executives’ interests with those of shareholders, via
either compensation contingent on firm perfor-
mance (Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1986) or exec-
utive stock ownership (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972;
Demsetz, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976); internal
monitoring by the board of directors (Fama & Jen-
sen, 1983; Mizruchi, 1983) or among managers
themselves (Fama, 1980; Lazear & Rosen, 1981);
and the external monitoring of large controlling
shareholders (e.g., blockholders; Demsetz & Lehn,
1985) or the “market for corporate control” (MCC)
(i.e., the threat of takeover; e.g., Alchian & Demsetz,
1972; Fama, 1980).
Existing evidence on the effectiveness of each of
the governance mechanisms is not encouraging.
For example, Dalton, Daily, Certo, and Roengp-
itya’s (2003: 20) meta-analysis of the relationship
between firm ownership structure and firm perfor-
mance found “relatively low relationships between
various categories of equity and multiple indicators
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of financial performance.” The extant evidence on
each of the other governance mechanisms is just as
equivocal (for recent reviews see Bebchuk & Fried,
2005; Dalton et al., 2007).
Some scholars have suggested that this lack of
evidence is due to a focus in prior corporate gover-
nance research on the independent effects of gov-
ernance mechanisms (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gos-
pel, & Jackson, 2008; Dalton et al., 2003; Rediker &
Seth, 1995). For the most part, research has been
concerned almost exclusively with the ability of gov-
ernance mechanisms “to resolve the shareholder–
manager agency problem independent of each
other” (Rediker & Seth, 1995: 86). The literature on
the relationship between firm ownership and firm
performance is again illustrative. Research has
sought to demonstrate the value of ownership as a
governance mechanism by showing a positive rela-
tionship between a particular type of ownership
(e.g., blockholdings) and firm performance irre-
spective of other mechanisms (for reviews, see Dal-
ton et al., 2003; Hunt, 1986; Kang & Sørensen,
1999). Dalton et al.’s (2003: 21) meta-analytic find-
ing of a negligible relationship between owner-
ship (of any type) and firm performance, how-
ever, led them to suggest that future research on
ownership should investigate the “substitution hy-
pothesis”: that “[o]wnership categories may effec-
tively substitute for another.”
This proposal to further examine the substitution
hypothesis by Dalton et al. (2003) was directly in-
spired by Rediker and Seth’s (1995) treatise “that
firm performance depends on the efficiency of a
bundle of governance mechanisms in controlling
the agency problem” (emphasis in original; 1995:
87). Other scholars have recently joined this call for
a more “holistic approach” to corporate governance
research (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009: 258) in which
the interdependencies of governance mechanisms
are examined to understand their effectiveness
(Aguilera, Desender, & Kabbach de Castro, 2012;
Aguilera et al., 2008; Tosi, 2008). Furthermore, this
recent work highlights that although governance
mechanisms have been conventionally considered
substitutes for one another (e.g., Dalton et al., 2003;
Zajac & Westphal, 1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995: 87),
it is contended by others that they operate as com-
plements (e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Tosi, Katz,
& Gomez-Mejia, 1997).
In the current study we directly answer these
calls to take a holistic approach to the study of
governance mechanisms and conduct an explor-
atory comparative case analysis of the S&P 1500
firms in 2005 with the aim of elaborating theory
(e.g., Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007; Vaughn, 1992)
on how the mechanisms work effectively together.
To do so, we first draw upon and integrate existing
theory and research to specify the bundle of mech-
anisms that operate to mitigate the agency problem.
We then examine the extant research that has in-
vestigated how these mechanisms combine. This
past research has focused on CEO incentives and
monitoring mechanisms operating as either substi-
tutes or as complements, and we consider how this
extends to the substitutability or complementarity
among the rest of the governance bundle. We use
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), in particu-
lar the fuzzy-set approach (fsQCA; e.g., Crilly,
2011; Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008), to explore the com-
binations of governance mechanisms that exist
among S&P 1500 firms that achieve high profitabil-
ity. Based on our findings, we develop several gen-
eral propositions on how the mechanisms work
together effectively as a governance bundle, and
conclude with a discussion of our study’s implica-
tions for future research and policy.
THE BUNDLE OF GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
The growing call among scholars that more atten-
tion must be paid toward how mechanisms operate
together as a governance bundle (Rediker & Seth,
1995) or as a “system of interdependent elements”
(Aguilera et al., 2008: 482) flows from the fact that
the majority of governance research has been rather
disparate in its examination of the (in)effectiveness
of one or another governance mechanism. We thus
first draw upon and integrate extant theory and
research to specify the fundamental mechanisms
that make up the governance bundle.
While past research has categorized the mecha-
nisms in different ways, a review of the literature
reveals somewhat of a consensus among gover-
nance researchers as to what mechanisms are es-
sential for controlling the agency problem. The
most general classification involves whether mech-
anisms are internal (e.g., executive incentives,
boards of directors) or external (e.g., shareholders
holding large blocks of shares, the MCC) to the firm
(Jensen, 1993; Walsh & Seward, 1990). Another dis-
tinction is whether the mechanisms serve to mon-
itor (e.g., boards of directors; external blockholders)
or align (e.g., performance-contingent compensa-
tion; executive equity holdings) executives’ deci-
sions and behaviors (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Tosi &
Gomez-Mejia, 1989, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1994).
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Dalton et al.’s (2007: 2) recent suggestion that there
are “three fundamental means of mitigating the
agency problem (e.g., independence [of the board],
equity [held by current and past executives and
directors or blockholders], and the market for cor-
porate control),” adds nothing new in terms of the
essential mechanisms involved (as they incorpo-
rate the external/internal and monitoring/incentive
classifications), but their distinction between the
alignment and control properties of equity owner-
ship is noteworthy: “Alignment refers to the effects
of insider [i.e., managers, directors] ownership, and
control refers to the effects of outside [i.e., block-
holders, institutional investors] ownership” (em-
phasis in original; Dalton et al., 2007: 15).
Rediker and Seth’s (1995) governance bundle
treatise—that the effectiveness of governance
mechanisms depends on their working together—
included each of the foregoing elements: they sug-
gest that internally, “monitoring by boards of di-
rectors and mutual monitoring by managers” and
the “incentive effects of management share own-
ership . . . and other elements of compensation
packages” substitute for one another, while exter-
nally the “the threat of takeover” and “monitoring
by large outside shareholders” work to replace each
other (: 86).
We draw upon this prior literature to specify the
governance bundle as consisting of the following
essential mechanisms: internal mechanisms en-
compass CEO incentive alignment, monitoring by
directors, and the alignment of and thus monitoring
among the top management team (TMT); external
governance involves control and monitoring by
large external shareholders and the takeover mar-
ket. We briefly explain each of these elements
in turn.
The first set of internal mechanisms work to align
CEO and shareholder interests through CEO com-
pensation contingent on firm performance and
through CEO stock ownership. The assumption is
that CEOs are “both effort- and risk-averse” (em-
phasis in original; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998: 284),
and thus CEO compensation contracts are struc-
tured to align CEOs with shareholders on both of
these fronts. The non-programmability of manage-
rial behaviors makes monitoring difficult (e.g., Tosi
& Gomez-Mejia, 1989), and thus compensation that
ties pay to performance is thought to align effort,
thereby lessening the agency problem (e.g., Eisen-
hardt, 1989). Including long-term incentives such
as stock options in compensation serves to align the
risk preferences of CEOs and shareholders (e.g.,
Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008).
While CEO ownership has received relatively less
attention than CEO compensation, such ownership
holdings are nevertheless a quintessential align-
ment mechanism (Demsetz, 1983; Jensen & Meck-
ling, 1976).
Second, several mechanisms are thought to affect
the monitoring effectiveness of the board of direc-
tors and thus firm performance: director indepen-
dence (i.e., outside (non-management) directors
who do not have a material relationship with the
firm or its management), outside director equity
ownership, the presence of non-TMT inside direc-
tors (e.g., ex-CEOs, founders, etc.), and CEO duality
(i.e., the CEO is also chairperson of the board).
Director independence is widely held to be critical
for vigilant monitoring—indeed, it seems to be con-
sidered somewhat of a “silver bullet” for gover-
nance. This is evidenced by the independence re-
quirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX) and the related stock exchange guidelines
(NYSE; NASDAQ) (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2009),
despite the ongoing academic debate as to whether
outside directors can ever be truly independent
(see Dalton et al., 2007). Although the merits of
director equity ownership have been questioned (as
it may create a conflict of interest; Dalton & Daily,
2001), such ownership is generally presumed to
align directors with shareholders (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). Indeed, some scholars have argued
that equity stakes are necessary for directors’ mon-
itoring vigilance (Hambrick & Jackson, 2000).
While the presence on boards of TMT members
other than the CEO (i.e., inside directors) is now
much less common since the passage of SOX (e.g.,
Linck et al., 2009), recent research has suggested
another type of inside director whose monitoring
may have an impact on firm performance: a past
CEO (e.g., Quigley & Hambrick, 2012) or founder
(or their family members) (e.g., Villalonga & Amit,
2006). Quigley and Hambrick (2012) suggested and
found that former CEOs who stay on boards hamper
the successor CEO’s ability to deliver performance
that deviates from pre-succession performance.
Whether the presence of founders (or their family)
on boards is beneficial or detrimental is an open
question (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), for while such
individuals typically hold substantial equity
stakes, they may also have “socioemotional” goals
beyond firm profitability (for a review, see Gomez-
Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011).
The final board mechanism, CEO duality, is com-
monly deemed to be critical for effective gover-
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nance and is rivaled only by board independence
as a favored mechanism. CEO duality is typically
considered detrimental to firm performance be-
cause it may allow the CEO to set the agenda of
board meetings and influence the recruitment of
directors to the board, and in general may protect
the CEO’s discretion (e.g., Mallette & Fowler, 1992),
thereby diminishing the “separation of decision
management and decision control” (Fama & Jensen,
1983: 314). This view has its detractors, however,
as CEO duality can be considered both functionally
and symbolically critical for firm success due to its
unity of command (e.g., see Dalton et al., 2007), for
which there is some evidence (Finkelstein &
D’Aveni, 1994).
The third set of internal mechanisms fundamen-
tal to the governance bundle involve aligning the
interests of top managers beyond the CEO, thereby
enhancing mutual monitoring among the top man-
agement (Fama, 1980; Rediker & Seth, 1995). The
two primary mechanisms theorized to align top
managers with shareholder interests are pay tour-
naments and managers’ equity holdings. Given that
monitoring requires being able to observe manage-
rial marginal products, which is difficult at best,
pay disparity between the CEO and TMT members
is suggested to provide “strong incentives that bet-
ter align principal-agent interests” (Henderson &
Fredrickson, 2001: 99). This is because such dis-
parity creates a “tournament” setting in which pay
is based on rank rather than marginal product, and
the grand prize (i.e., CEO pay) is inherently moti-
vating (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986). Fur-
thermore, while we have already considered the
alignment of CEOs via their equity stakes, the align-
ment properties of ownership held by the other
members of the TMT are presumed to be no less
important to effective governance (e.g., Dalton et
al., 2007; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
Turning to external mechanisms, prior theory
suggests two mechanisms as being integral to the
governance bundle: large external shareholders and
the MCC. Researchers and policy makers alike have
long considered the presence of an investor holding
a large block of the firm’s equity (i.e., blockholder)
as being a primary control mechanism (for reviews,
see Dalton et al., 2007; Hunt, 1986). Indeed, the
central thesis of managerial capitalist theory is that
effective governance will not occur when such ex-
ternal ownership is absent (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, Tosi,
& Hinkin, 1987; Marris, 1998; Williamson, 1964).
To wit, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) requires that investors owning 5% or more of
the firm must disclose their holdings. Although the
threat of takeover posed by the MCC is believed to
have waned somewhat as a constraint (see Dalton et
al., 2007; Grossman & Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1993), it
has long been held as the fundamental mechanism
of last resort in the governance bundle (Alchian &
Demsetz, 1972; Fama, 1980; Rediker & Seth, 1995).
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AS
SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS?
While the foregoing clarifies what mechanisms
make up the governance bundle, we now consider
how these governance mechanisms effectively op-
erate together. The research that has been done in
this regard suggests, on the one hand, that they
operate as substitutes (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996;
Dalton et al., 2003; Demsetz, 1983; Zajac & West-
phal, 1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995: 87), and on the
other, that they operate as complements (Aguilera
et al., 2008; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Tosi et al.,
1997; Tosi, 2008).
The substitution perspective posits that gover-
nance mechanisms replace one another (e.g., Dal-
ton et al., 2003; Rediker & Seth, 1995), a premise
that directly flows from the market equilibrium
arguments inherent in agency theory (e.g., see
Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Jensen & Meckling,
1976). The conceptual drivers of the substitution
between mechanisms are efficiency and relative
costs; governance structures are presumed to be the
outcome of a process “in which various cost advan-
tages and disadvantages are balanced to arrive at an
equilibrium organization of the firm” (Demsetz,
1983: 384). In essence, the agency problem is
thought to be resolved because decreases in CEO
ownership (i.e., as ownership becomes more dis-
persed) are offset by increases in CEO contingent
pay (i.e., performance-based incentives; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976) or increases in monitoring (Fama,
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983).
Thus, that CEO contingent compensation substi-
tutes for CEO equity ownership is pivotal in agency
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).1 It also directly
flows from this seminal argument that monitoring
1 The subsequent literature has also shown that due to
the risk (averse) preferences of CEOs, there are limits to
the amount of contingent compensation CEOs are willing
to bear and thus typically compensation contracts must
also contain a fixed or cash-based element (e.g., Bloom &
Milkovich, 1998; Holmstrom, 1979; Zajac & West-
phal, 1994).
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and CEO incentive alignment mechanisms substi-
tute for one another, for which there is some evi-
dence (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995;
Zajac & Westphal, 1994). For example, Beatty and
Zajac (1994) lend support to this notion of substi-
tution in their findings that monitoring by both the
board and by blockholders was inversely related to
both types of CEO incentive alignment (CEO stock
ownership; CEO contingent compensation). More-
over, as they succinctly noted, CEO incentives and
monitoring are considered to replace one another
in an additive but mutually exclusive manner, as
the agency perspective holds
incentive contracting as a first-best solution to the
agency problem and emphasize[s] that the optimal
level of monitoring would be based on the magni-
tude of the incentive gap between principal and
agent. [. . .] Strong monitoring is therefore particu-
larly appropriate when managerial incentives are
only weakly tied to firm performance, and the ben-
efits of monitoring would outweigh the costs (Beatty
& Zajac, 1994: 317).
Finally, this perspective suggests that monitoring
mechanisms substitute for each other (Agrawal &
Knoeber, 1996; Rediker & Seth, 1995). That is, mon-
itoring may occur via the vigilance of boards or
managers or large outside shareholders or the MCC.
Rediker and Seth (1995) suggested that their find-
ing of an inverse relationship between the outsider
ratio and external blockholdings supports this no-
tion. This led Dalton et al. (2003: 21) to posit that in
addition to ownership types substituting for each
other, “alternative governance mechanisms may
[also] substitute for ownership structure.”
A somewhat more integrative view of corporate
governance has emerged, however, that considers
how governance “practices interact and potentially
complement each other as related bundles” (Aguil-
era et al., 2008: 483). For instance, Aguilera et al.
(2008: 484) suggested that “performance incentives
for executives are more effective when comple-
mented with a high level of board independence
and an effective market for corporate control” and
thus implied complementarity between CEO incen-
tives and monitoring instead of substitution. Rather
than the replacement between mechanisms, what
conceptually underlies the complementarity perspec-
tive is mutual enhancement (e.g., Milgrom & Roberts,
1992): governance mechanisms are suggested to op-
erate in a complementary manner because their mu-
tual presence increases the effectiveness of each (e.g.,
Aguilera et al., 2008; Tosi, 2008; Tosi et al., 1997).
Thus, the notion of complementarity here is a syner-
gistic rather than an additive one (cf. Ennen & Richter,
2010)—it builds on the idea that “the gain from in-
creasing every component . . . is more than the sum of
gains from the separate individual increases” (Mil-
grom & Roberts, 1992: 5).
Aguilera et al.’s (2008) recent complementarity
treatise notwithstanding, there has been relatively
little work on this perspective beyond the national
comparative level (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2012), and
the focus of extant research has been on the com-
plementarity between monitoring and CEO incen-
tives. In essence, this literature has argued that
because there is great difficulty and ambiguity in-
volved in observing executive behaviors as well as
in measuring performance outcomes in large cor-
porations (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989), incentives and
monitoring necessarily function as complements:
both must be present for effective governance (Mil-
grom & Roberts, 1992; Tosi et al., 1997). Milgrom
and Roberts (1992) first suggested this as they ar-
gued that incentives and monitoring can only act as
substitutes when effort or its outcomes can be ac-
curately measured. They argued that when such
accuracy is not possible, incentives and monitoring
are then complementary: when the measurement of
either an agent’s behavior or its outcomes is diffi-
cult, both monitoring and incentives will be chosen
because “undertaking either activity makes the
other more effective” (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992:
227). Tosi and colleagues (Tosi, 2008; Tosi et al.,
1997) echoed and built on this view, as did Aguil-
era et al. (2008). Studies showing that CEO contin-
gent pay is more strongly linked to firm perfor-
mance when external blockholders are present
(e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Tosi & Gomez-
Mejia, 1989) are further suggestive of this notion.
In comparing the substitution and complementa-
rity perspectives, one apparent difference thus
involves how monitoring and CEO incentive
mechanisms are thought to combine. From the
substitution perspective, these types of mecha-
nisms replace each other and are mutually exclu-
sive—only one or the other need be present for
effective governance. Complementarity, on the
other hand, argues for the co-presence of monitor-
ing and CEO incentives—both types of mecha-
nisms need to be present for effective governance to
occur. In other words, although both perspectives
consider the co-occurrence of the mechanisms,
more of one means less of the other in substitution
theory (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Westphal,
1994), while they are mutually enhancing in com-
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plementarity theory (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008;
Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Simply put, whereas
substitution theory suggests that either monitoring or
CEO incentives can be present for effective gover-
nance, complementarity theory posits that monitor-
ing and CEO incentives must be present for effective
governance. The question for the current inquiry is
then: can publicly traded corporations in the United
States achieve high profitability when just CEO in-
centives or monitoring mechanisms are present? Or
must both CEO incentives and monitoring mecha-
nisms be present to obtain high profits?
Beyond this inherent difference with respect to
how monitoring and CEO incentive mechanisms
combine, extant theory provides very little guid-
ance as to how the rest of the governance bundle
works together. For one thing, it is not at all clear
whether the mechanisms aimed at enhancing the
monitoring of internal actors serve as substitutes or
complements. For instance, both the independence
of outside directors and such directors’ holdings of
the firm’s equity are suggested as mechanisms that
heighten the monitoring of this inside actor. While
substitution theory would suggest that these two
mechanisms replace each other, the suggestion that
equity stakes are required to motivate directors
(Hambrick & Jackson, 2000) implies instead that
these two mechanisms are mutually enhancing—
director independence is not effective unless there
are also director ownership stakes present. The
question is, then, can outside director equity stakes
make up for (i.e., substitute) the lack of indepen-
dence? Or do these two mechanisms complement
each other? Similar questions arise with respect to
the other within-actor combinations. Are CEO con-
tingent pay and CEO ownership stakes substitutes
or complements? Do TMT tournaments substitute
or complement for TMT ownership stakes?
Furthermore, we read the complementarity per-
spective on governance as taking a somewhat
broader view than that of the substitution perspec-
tive in that it seems to inherently support both
substitution and complementarity. Thus, this raises
the question as to whether there is simultaneity of
substitution and complementarity across the gover-
nance bundle. For instance, it is possible that some
form of CEO incentive alignment mechanism and
some form of monitoring mechanism need to be
present for good firm performance (i.e., CEO in-
centives and monitoring are complements not
substitutes), while at the same time the various
monitoring mechanisms may be substitutes and/or
complements for each other—be this substitution
or complementarity occurring within actors (e.g.,
TMT tournaments substituting or complementing
TMT equity holdings) and/or between internal actors
(e.g., outside director mechanisms substituting/com-
plementing TMT mechanisms), between external ac-
tors (blockholdings substituting/complementing the
MCC), or between internal and external mechanisms
(e.g., outside director mechanisms substituting/com-
plementing for blockholdings).
In short, how mechanisms effectively combine as
a governance bundle is a complex issue, and thus,
as Aguilera et al. (2008) have suggested, it is per-
haps not surprising that “these combinations re-
main to be systematically theorized” (: 484). We
now turn to such a theory-building effort by explor-
ing these questions through a comparative case
analysis of how the specified bundle of mecha-
nisms operates to generate firm profitability among
S&P 1500 firms.
METHOD
In the current study we use the fuzzy-set quali-
tative comparative approach to case analysis (e.g.,
fsQCA; Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008), and
while an in-depth explanation of this method is
beyond the purview of the current study, we briefly
explain the central features of fsQCA pertinent to
our inquiry (see also Greckhamer, Misangyi, Elms,
& Lacey, 2008 for a tutorial of the set-theoretic
method aimed at management researchers). In
brief, fsQCA takes the perspective that cases are
constituted by combinations of theoretically rele-
vant attributes (i.e., governance mechanisms), that
the relationships between these attributes and the
outcome of interest (i.e., firm profits) can be under-
stood through the examination of subset relations
(Ragin, 2000, 2008), and thus that the attributes and
the outcome are “best understood in terms of set
membership” (italics in original; Fiss, 2007: 1183).
In particular, our exploratory analyses investigate
what, if any, combinations of governance mecha-
nisms are sufficient for obtaining high firm profits.
While we further explain sufficiency analyses below,
the initial methodological steps involve the selection
of the theoretically relevant cases and the coding of
their set memberships in the outcome and in each
governance mechanism.
Sample
The cases under study are the firms that made up
the S&P 1500 in 2005. We chose this sample for a
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number of reasons. First, it is consistent with previ-
ous governance research (e.g., Haynes & Hillman,
2010; Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Second, fsQCA
does not involve statistical inference or rely on prob-
ability theory, and thus does not lend itself to gener-
alization beyond the sample (see Greckhamer, Misan-
gyi, & Fiss, 2013). Therefore, we chose to study the
S&P 1500 firms not only because it means our find-
ings apply to an important population of firms, but
also because small, medium and large firms are fairly
equally represented (i.e., the S&P 1500 is a composite
index made up of the S&P 500 firms, the S&P MidCap
firms and the S&P SmallCap firms). Third, we chose
this time frame because it is subsequent to the pas-
sage of SOX and precedes the financial crisis that
began in 2007. Nevertheless, while our study calls for
a cross-case comparison of governance mechanisms,
we also employed a lagged design: governance mech-
anisms were measured in 2005, while firm profits
were measured in 2006. The Risk Metrics and Com-
pustat Execucomp archival databases essentially
cover the S&P 1500 firms, and thus we drew our
initial sample from these databases, from which data
were available for 1,358 firms. From this initial sam-
ple we excluded 160 firms that had a CEO succession
event in 2005 or 2006. An additional 63 firms had to
be dropped due to missing data, but mean difference
tests on key governance attributes for which we had
data found no significant differences. Our final sam-
ple consisted of 1,135 firms.
Calibration of Set Memberships
The data come from archival data sources—Risk
Metrics, the Compustat Annual and Execucomp
files, Compact Disclosure, and firms’ annual proxy
statements—and we followed Ragin (2008) in cali-
brating fuzzy-set memberships. In general, calibra-
tion requires transforming conventional archival
measures according to three qualitative thresh-
olds: full membership, the crossover point, and
full non-membership. For each calibration, we
set these thresholds based on extant theory and
substantive knowledge and utilized the direct
method of calibration in the fsQCA software to
transform the measures into set memberships
(e.g., Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008). Table 1 summa-
rizes the fuzzy sets and the underlying measures
used to capture each of the various governance
mechanisms, including the calibration thresh-
olds for each fuzzy set and selected descriptives
of the underlying measures.
Outcome: Firm Profits
High firm profits. The outcome of interest in the
current study is firm profitability—and in particu-
lar, high firm profitability, given that corporate gov-
ernance is concerned with profit maximization—
which we measured via firm return on assets (ROA)
for 2006 (calculated as net income divided by total
assets). We calibrated membership in the set of
firms with high profitability using the following
thresholds, consistent with Fiss (2011): firms that
were at or below the median ROA of their respec-
tive industry were coded as “fully out” of the set of
high profit firms; firms with ROA in the upper
quartile of their industry (i.e.,  75th percentile)
were coded as “fully in” the set of high profit firms;
and we used the halfway mark between these
thresholds as the crossover point (i.e., this point
represents “neither in nor out” of the set of high
profit firms, or in other words, the demarcation
point of a difference in kind with respect to the
particular attribute or outcome being assessed; see
Ragin, 2008). Industry ROA median and upper
quartile scores were calculated based on all firms
listed in the Compustat annual file in the same
two-digit SIC as the focal company in 2006.
Not-high firm profits. We also sought to under-
stand whether and how the various governance
mechanisms combine in the absence of high prof-
its. This is accomplished by taking the converse of
the outcome (e.g., see Fiss, 2011), or membership in
the set of firms with not-high profitability, which is
captured by the negation of the high profit fuzzy set
described above (so here, fully in  median ROA;
fully out  75th percentile; crossover  half-
way point).
Governance Mechanisms
Outside director mechanisms. As discussed
above, both the independence and the alignment of
outside directors are essential mechanisms of out-
side director monitoring.
Outside director independence. Outside direc-
tors’ independence may be compromised when the
directors have been appointed during the tenure of
the current CEO (i.e., they feel beholden; e.g., West-
phal & Zajac, 1995), are currently CEOs of an-
other company themselves (i.e., they will be overly
sympathetic to the CEO’s suggestions; e.g., Hill-
man, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008), or have some
type of material relationship to the firm or its
management (SOX; NASDAQ; NYSE; e.g., Linck,
2014 1687Misangyi and Acharya
T
A
B
L
E
1
T
h
e
B
u
n
d
le
of
G
ov
er
n
an
ce
M
ec
h
an
is
m
s:
S
et
M
em
be
rs
h
ip
s
an
d
C
al
ib
ra
ti
on
s/
M
ea
su
re
s
an
d
S
am
p
le
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
s
F
u
zz
y
S
et
C
a
li
b
ra
ti
on
s
M
ea
su
re
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
s
M
ec
h
an
is
m
F
u
zz
y
S
et
/M
ea
su
re
F
u
ll
y
In
C
ro
ss
ov
er
F
u
ll
y
O
u
t
M
ea
n
S
D
M
ax
M
in
In
te
rn
al
M
ec
h
an
is
m
s
C
E
O
L
T
C
on
ti
n
ge
n
t
P
ay
a
F
ir
m
s
w
it
h
a
C
E
O
w
h
os
e
st
oc
k
op
ti
on
s
re
p
re
se
n
t
a
su
bs
ta
n
ti
al
st
ak
e/
C
E
O
’s
ac
cu
m
u
la
te
d
u
n
ex
er
ci
se
d
ex
er
ci
sa
bl
e

u
n
ex
er
ci
sa
bl
e
op
ti
on
s
9
4.
93
0.
86
18
.7
9
63
.4
5
1,
77
6.
55
0
C
E
O
E
qu
it
y
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
a
F
ir
m
s
th
at
h
av
e
a
C
E
O
w
it
h
a
su
bs
ta
n
ti
al
eq
u
it
y
st
ak
e/
C
E
O
’s
sh
ar
eh
ol
d
in
gs

u
n
ve
st
ed
re
st
ri
ct
ed
st
oc
k
gr
an
ts
9
4.
93
0.
86
77
.7
1
38
5.
99
10
,1
83
.8
5
0
O
u
ts
id
e
D
ir
ec
to
r
In
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
b
F
ir
m
s
w
it
h
an
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
bo
ar
d
/r
at
io
of
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
d
ir
ec
to
rs
on
th
e
bo
ar
d
.6
6
or
.5
0
.1
5
0
0.
27
0.
22
0.
89
0
O
u
ts
id
e
D
ir
ec
to
r
E
qu
it
y
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
a
,b
F
ir
m
s
th
at
h
av
e
a
bo
ar
d
w
it
h
ou
ts
id
e
d
ir
ec
to
r
su
bs
ta
n
ti
al
st
ak
es
/r
at
io
of
ou
ts
id
e
d
ir
ec
to
rs
w
it
h
a
su
bs
ta
n
ti
al
st
ak
e
.6
6
or
.5
0
.1
5
0
0.
41
0.
26
1.
00
0
T
M
T
T
ou
rn
am
en
t
F
ir
m
s
th
at
h
av
e
a
h
ig
h
C
E
O
–T
M
T
p
ay
d
is
p
ar
it
y/
C
E
O
’s
to
ta
l
p
ay
d
iv
id
ed
by
av
er
ag
e
T
M
T
to
ta
l
p
ay
4
2.
75
1.
5
3.
01
2.
11
38
.8
8
0
T
M
T
E
qu
it
y
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
a
F
ir
m
s
in
w
h
ic
h
th
e
T
M
T
m
em
be
r
w
it
h
th
e
m
os
t
ow
n
er
sh
ip
h
as
a
su
bs
ta
n
ti
al
st
ak
e/
T
M
T
m
em
be
r’
s
sh
ar
eh
ol
d
in
gs

re
st
ri
ct
ed
st
oc
k
gr
an
ts
0.
19
0.
11
0.
32
1.
80
8.
55
21
6.
58
0
N
on
-T
M
T
In
si
d
e
D
ir
ec
to
r
E
qu
it
y
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
a
F
ir
m
s
th
at
h
av
e
a
n
on
-T
M
T
in
si
d
e
d
ir
ec
to
r
w
it
h
a
su
bs
ta
n
ti
al
st
ak
e/
n
on
-T
M
T
in
si
d
e
d
ir
ec
to
r’
s
sh
ar
eh
ol
d
in
gs
9
4.
93
0.
86
10
4.
87
38
6.
76
2,
90
8.
70
0
C
E
O
D
u
al
it
y
(D
u
al
it
y)
F
ir
m
s
th
at
h
av
e
a
C
E
O
w
h
o
is
al
so
th
e
ch
ai
r
of
th
e
bo
ar
d
/C
E
O
d
u
al
it
y

1,
ot
h
er
w
is
e
0
C
E
O
is
th
e
ch
ai
r
C
E
O
is
n
ot
th
e
ch
ai
r
0.
60
0.
49
1.
00
0
E
xt
er
n
al
M
ec
h
an
is
m
s
E
xt
er
n
al
B
lo
ck
h
ol
d
er
sc
F
ir
m
s
th
at
h
av
e
p
re
ss
u
re
-r
es
is
ta
n
t
ex
te
rn
al
bl
oc
kh
ol
d
er
s/
ex
te
rn
al
st
oc
kh
ol
d
er
s
h
ol
d
in
g
at
le
as
t
5%
of
th
e
fi
rm
’s
ou
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
sh
ar
es
cl
as
si
fi
ed
as
p
re
ss
u
re
re
si
st
an
t
or
se
n
si
ti
ve
1
.6
6/
.3
3
0
0.
68
0.
47
1.
00
0
M
ar
ke
t
fo
r
C
or
p
or
at
e
C
on
tr
ol
F
ir
m
s
th
at
fa
ce
an
ac
ti
ve
ac
qu
is
it
io
n
m
ar
ke
t/
p
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
of
ac
qu
is
it
io
n
in
a
fi
rm
’s
in
d
u
st
ry
ov
er
th
e
p
re
vi
ou
s
5
ye
ar
s
.2
0
.1
3
.1
1
0.
15
0.
08
0.
67
0
a
A
ll
st
oc
k
op
ti
on
an
d
eq
u
it
y
h
ol
d
in
gs
ar
e
in
m
il
li
on
s
of
d
ol
la
rs
as
of
th
e
en
d
of
20
05
.
b
F
or
bo
ar
d
s
w
it
h
su
p
er
m
aj
or
it
y
vo
ti
n
g
re
qu
ir
em
en
t,
fu
ll
y
in

.6
6;
fo
r
bo
ar
d
s
re
qu
ir
in
g
a
si
m
p
le
m
aj
or
it
y,
fu
ll
y
in

.5
0.
c
W
e
co
d
ed
ex
te
rn
al
bl
oc
kh
ol
d
er
s
u
si
n
g
a
fo
u
r-
va
lu
e
fu
zz
y
se
t:
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
p
re
ss
u
re
-r
es
is
ta
n
t
bl
oc
kh
ol
d
er
s
(a
n
ge
l/
V
C
in
ve
st
or
s,
h
ed
ge
fu
n
d
s/
p
ri
va
te
eq
u
it
y,
en
d
ow
m
en
ts
/
fo
u
n
d
at
io
n
s)
w
er
e
co
d
ed
as
be
in
g
fu
ll
y
in
th
is
se
t
(
1)
,
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
bl
oc
kh
ol
d
er
s
w
it
h
in
ve
st
m
en
t/
as
se
t
m
an
ag
er
s,
m
u
tu
al
fu
n
d
s,
an
d
in
ve
st
m
en
t
co
u
n
se
lo
rs
(i
.e
.,
si
m
il
ar
to
th
e
p
re
ss
u
re
-i
n
d
et
er
m
in
at
e
bl
oc
kh
ol
d
er
s
of
p
as
t
re
se
ar
ch
)
w
er
e
cl
as
si
fi
ed
as
m
or
e
in
th
an
ou
t
(.
66
),
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
p
re
ss
u
re
-s
en
si
ti
ve
bl
oc
kh
ol
d
er
s
(i
n
su
ra
n
ce
co
m
p
an
ie
s,
ba
n
ks
,
co
m
p
an
ie
s/
h
ol
d
in
g
co
m
p
an
ie
s,
n
on
ba
n
k
tr
u
st
s)
w
er
e
co
d
ed
as
be
in
g
m
or
e
ou
t
th
an
in
th
is
se
t
(.
33
),
an
d
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
n
o
ex
te
rn
al
bl
oc
kh
ol
d
er
s
w
er
e
co
d
ed
as
be
in
g
fu
ll
y
ou
t
(0
).
T
h
e
d
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
at
is
ti
cs
re
p
re
se
n
t
th
e
p
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
fi
rm
s
(6
8%
)
in
th
e
sa
m
p
le
th
at
h
ad
at
le
as
t
on
e
bl
oc
kh
ol
d
er
cl
as
si
fi
ed
as
a
.6
6
or
1
on
th
is
fu
zz
y
se
t.
Netter, & Yang, 2009). Thus, we classified each
outside director as being independent if they met
all three of the following criteria: (1) they are clas-
sified as “independent” in the Risk Metrics data-
base, (2) they joined the board before the incum-
bent CEO’s start date, and (3) they are not currently
a CEO for another company. We then calculated the
proportion of independent directors on the board
(the number of independent directors divided by
the total board size), and used this measure to as-
sess each firm’s membership in the set of firms with
an independent board of directors based on the
following theoretically and substantively derived
calibration thresholds. We set the “fully in” thresh-
old based on the voting provisions specified in
each company’s charter with respect to major gov-
ernance decisions: the proportion of independent
directors on the board  .66 for firms requiring a
supermajority and  .50 for those firms requiring a
simple majority. Firms with no independent direc-
tors on their board were coded as fully out. In cali-
brating the crossover point, we followed the groups
literature (e.g., Laughlin & Adamopoulos, 1980)
which suggests that the presence of two such direc-
tors will be enough to give these directors the voice
needed to make a difference (i.e., this represents a
difference in kind). Given that the average board size
of our sample firms was nine (SD  2), we set the
crossover point at .15, as this meant that firms with
two or more independent directors would be cali-
brated as being more in than out of this set.
Outside director ownership. Hambrick and Jack-
son (2000) argued that directors must “hold mean-
ingful amounts of equity” (: 12) to be motivated to
monitor management. Moreover, they contended
that directors need to have a sizable portion of their
own wealth invested in the firm in order to have a
meaningful stake (rather than the typical referenc-
ing of the percentage of the firm’s ownership held),
accounting for roughly 3–5% of the director’s total
net wealth (at the time of their study this amounted
to $500,000). We followed this research and thus
identified those outside directors with a substantial
stake, which we defined as $860,000, in the focal
firm. This is the 2005 equivalent of Hambrick and
Jackson’s (2000) specification (and incidentally,
very close to the $849,000 median value of equity
held by outside directors in our sample).2 More-
over, this amount of ownership represents approxi-
mately 5% of such individuals’ net worth: the net
worth of the individuals who typically serve as direc-
tors (i.e., current or retired business executives) put
them among the top 1% of the income distribution
in the United States (Bakija, Cole, & Heim, 2010), and
the average net worth of those among the top 1% is
around $18 million dollars (in 2007; Wolff, 2010).
Directors’ equity stakes (like all ownership stakes in
this study) were calculated by valuing the 2005 fiscal
year-end total number of firm shares held by each
director using the average of the bid and ask price of
the firm’s stock at the end of fiscal 2005. We then
calculated the proportion of outside directors with
substantial stakes on each board and used this to code
each firm’s membership in the set of firms with a
board comprised of outside directors holding a sub-
stantial equity stake in the firm. Our calibration
thresholds for this fuzzy set followed the same logic
used in calibrating the independent board set (i.e.,
fully in  .66 (supermajority)/ fully in  .50 (simple
majority); crossover  .15; fully out  0).
Non-TMT inside directors. We followed previ-
ous research (e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001)
and defined the TMT as the top five highest-paid
executives as listed in the companies’ proxy state-
ments (as captured by the Execucomp database).
We defined non-TMT inside directors, then, as
those inside directors that were not a part of this
TMT, but were part of either the current or past
management of the firm (i.e., ex-CEOs, founders,
subsidiary executives, etc.). Among the cases stud-
ied, there were a total of 124 cases which had a
non-TMT inside director (44 were former CEOs, 24
were founders or family members of the founders,
the remaining 60 were company employees who
were not part of the TMT; 70 of the 124 non-TMT
inside directors were the chair of the board). As
with outside directors, we used the firm equity
held by non-TMT inside directors as indicative of
their monitoring potential, and thus assessed
each firm’s membership in the set of firms with a
non-TMT inside director with a substantial equity
stake in the firm. We used the same minimum
threshold for a substantial stake as in calibrating
outside directors’ ownership stakes (i.e., fully out
2 We deemed this threshold to be applicable across all
directors (i.e., across directors of small vs. mid vs. large
cap firms) given that through descriptive analyses we
found that (1) a similar proportion of the directors in the
sample were currently also CEOs across the three firm size
categories (.21, .21, and .23, respectively), and (2) 95% of
the directors that sat on multiple boards had their board
seats span the different size categories of firms (e.g., they sat
on boards of small, mid, and large cap firms).
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 $860,000)—the individuals typically serving as a
non-TMT inside director (e.g., ex-CEOs, founders)
are also among the top 1% of the U.S. income
distribution (indeed, median equity holdings of
non-TMT inside directors in our sample were $8.9
million; see Table 1 for more descriptives). We set
the “fully in” threshold at $9 million (i.e., one half
of the individual’s net worth), as extant evidence
suggests that the average “one-percenter” in the
United States has about 50% of their net worth
invested in stocks (Wolff, 2010). The crossover
point was set at $4.93 million (halfway point; e.g.,
Fiss, 2011).
CEO duality. We assessed each firm’s member-
ship in the set of firms that have a CEO who is also
the chairperson of the board using a crisp set such
that firms in which the CEO also held the position
of chairperson were coded as fully in and firms
where the CEO was not also the chairperson were
coded as fully out.
CEO incentive alignment mechanisms. Both
CEO contingent compensation and CEO ownership
are mechanisms that should work to align CEO
interests with those of shareholders.
CEO contingent compensation. CEO contingent
compensation comes almost wholly in the form of
stock options and restricted stock grants. Although
previous governance research has treated these to-
gether in measuring CEOs’ contingent pay, the find-
ings of a study by Devers et al. (2008) clearly sug-
gest that they incent CEOs differently with respect
to risk taking. In essence, CEOs treat unvested re-
stricted stock grants as if they already own these
shares—i.e., this form of pay is viewed by CEOs
similarly to the equity ownership they already
hold. We thus treated restricted stock grants in this
study as part of the CEO’s ownership position and
confined contingent pay to stock options. Further-
more, our concern in the current study was with
firm profits and not risk taking; thus, although De-
vers et al. (2008) made distinctions between the
separate effects of exercisable and unexercisable
options on risk taking, it is not clear that these
would operate differently with respect to firm prof-
itability. Thus, we measured options stakes by
summing the dollar value of each CEO’s accumu-
lated unexercised exercisable and unexercisable
options as of the end of 2005.3 We then assessed
each firm’s membership in the set of firms with a
CEO whose accumulated unexercised stock options
represent a substantial stake in the firm. CEOs of
the S&P 1500 firms are among the top 1% of the
income distribution in the U.S.A. (Bakija et al.,
2010) (see also Table 1) and thus we calibrated this
fuzzy set using the same thresholds as just de-
scribed for non-TMT inside director ownership
(fully out  $860,000; crossover  $4.93 million;
fully in  $9 million).
CEO equity ownership. The amount of the firms’
equity that CEOs hold is the quintessential incen-
tive alignment mechanism (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Given the findings of Devers et al. (2008)
discussed above, we captured each CEO’s owner-
ship stake by summing the dollar value of the
CEO’s share holdings and the dollar value of their
unvested restricted stock grants as of the end of
2005. We assessed each firm’s membership in the
set of firms that have a CEO with a substantial
equity stake in the firm using the calibration
thresholds just described (fully out  $860,000;
crossover  $4.93 million; fully in  $9 million).
TMT mechanisms. Two mechanisms have been
theorized to align the top managers other than the
CEO, thereby enhancing their monitoring: pay tour-
naments and equity holdings. Again, the TMT was
defined as the top five highest-paid managers, not
including the CEO.
TMT tournaments. Consistent with previous re-
search (e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001; Siegel
& Hambrick, 2005) we measured the CEO–TMT pay
disparity as the CEO’s total pay divided by the
average TMT total pay (where total pay for both 
the TDC1 variable in the Execucomp database). We
then assessed each firm’s membership in the set of
firms with a high CEO–TMT pay disparity using the
following calibration: we set fully out  1.5 (i.e.,
the CEO’s pay is approximately 1.5 times higher
than the average TMT member) based on the extant
empirical evidence which suggests that the norma-
tive differential between managerial levels is
around 40% (e.g., Carpenter & Sanders, 2002). We
set fully in  4 (CEO pay is 4 times that of average
TMT pay), based on extant theory (e.g., Lazear &
Rosen (1981) argued that the tripling of salary on
promotion of a TMT member to CEO cannot be
explained by economic theory, but can be ex-
plained by tournament theory) and extant evidence
(the mean pay gap found by Siegel & Hambrick
3 We also ran the analyses using simply the accumu-
lated unexercised exercisable options as the measure of
options—as all CEOs had such options—and our findings are robust to this alternative measure.
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(2005) was 2.83; incidentally, the mean pay gap in
the current sample is 3.0). The crossover was set as
the halfway point ( 2.75) (e.g., Fiss, 2011).
TMT ownership. While previous research con-
cerned with managerial ownership has typically
examined equity held by all managers and directors
(e.g., Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) or inside direc-
tors (e.g., Rediker & Seth, 1995), our interest here is
with TMT equity holdings (not the CEO). In set-
ting the calibration thresholds, we again followed
theory—we sought to capture the amount of the
individual’s net worth at stake (Hambrick & Jack-
son, 2000)—as well as extant substantive knowl-
edge. With respect to the latter, this meant that we
had to come up with a reasonable estimate of the
net worth of the typical TMT member. The median
annual pay (i.e., salary plus bonus) for TMT mem-
bers in our sample was $591,000 ($1.2 million in
total pay, i.e., including long-term contingent pay
such as stock options), and given that the average
savings rate over the decade prior to 2005 was
around 3% (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2013), we conservatively placed TMT members
in the top 20% (i.e., in the range 11–20%) of the
income distribution in the United States as the
mean net worth of this bracket of the income dis-
tribution was around $650,000 (in 2007; Wolff,
2010). Again, following the findings of Devers et al.
(2008), we included both the dollar value of the
equity held by each TMT and the dollar value of the
restricted stock grants held. We used the ownership
of the TMT member with the highest ownership
stake because approximately two-thirds of TMT
members held no ownership stakes and thus, using
the average TMT ownership would mask the pres-
ence of at least one aligned TMT member, and
extant theory would seem to suggest that the pres-
ence of even one TMT member with a substantial
stake should enhance monitoring (Fama, 1980). We
assessed each firm’s membership in the set of firms
in which the TMT member holding the most own-
ership has a substantial stake in the firm, using the
following thresholds: fully out  $32,100 of equity
held (5% of their net worth); fully in  $190,000 of
equity held (median holdings of sample); and
crossover  $111,000 (halfway point; e.g.,
Fiss, 2011).
External blockholders. Theory clearly suggests
that large blockholdings should serve as an external
control mechanism, but scholarship focusing on
institutional investors suggests an additional factor
to be considered beyond block ownership in the
firm, namely whether such external investors are
“resistant” or “sensitive” to the pressures from
firms’ management to go along with managerial
objectives and wishes (e.g., Brickley, Lease, &
Smith, 1988; David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998;
Kochhar & David, 1996). This latter research al-
lowed us to capture how actively blockholders
would monitor and exercise control. First we iden-
tified the presence of external blockholders at each
firm (i.e., any non-management/non-director stock-
holders holding at least 5% of the firm’s outstand-
ing common shares), and then assessed each firm’s
membership in the set of firms which have pres-
sure-resistant external blockholders using a four-
value fuzzy set (see Ragin, 2008) in which firms
with blockholders considered pressure resistant
(angel/VC investors, hedge funds/private equity,
endowments/foundations) were coded as being
fully in this set ( 1), firms with blockholders that
were investment/asset managers, mutual funds,
and investment counselors (i.e., similar to the pres-
sure-indeterminate investors of past research)4
were classified as more in than out (.66), firms with
pressure-sensitive blockholders (insurance compa-
nies, banks, companies/holding companies, non-
bank trusts) were coded as being more out than in
(.33), and firms with no external blockholders were
coded as being fully out (0).
Market for corporate control. The potential
threat of being taken over if management grossly
underperforms stands as a mechanism of last resort
in the governance bundle. We thus assessed each
firm’s membership in the set of firms that face an
active acquisition market. First, following Agrawal
and Knoeber (1996), we measured the threat of take-
over facing each firm as the probability of acquisition
in a firm’s industry (two-digit SIC), calculated as
the ratio of de-listed firms due to a merger during the
period January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2005 to the
number of firms that existed in the firm’s industry as
of December 29, 2000. We then calibrated member-
ship in this fuzzy set by the distribution of the threat
posed across the 67 industries in the study sample:
4 Note that past research has classified firms as being
pressure resistant (public pension funds, mutual funds,
endowments/foundations), pressure sensitive (insurance
companies, banks, non-trust banks), or pressure indeter-
minate (corporate pension funds, brokerage houses, in-
vestment counselors). We followed this classification
scheme, but adjusted it to better reflect the time period of
our study, which included not classifying mutual funds
as being fully resistant due to their wide variety and the
many scandals that have come to light among them.
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firms in an industry with a proportion  .20 (75th
percentile) were coded as fully in, those in an indus-
try with a proportion  .11 (25th percentile) were
coded as fully out, and the median was used as the
crossover point (proportion  .13).
Fuzzy-Set Analyses
When a governance mechanism or combination of
mechanisms is sufficient for high firm profits, the
occurrence of the mechanism(s) is always accompa-
nied by high firm profits (see Ragin, 2000). Suffi-
ciency thus implies that the governance mecha-
nism(s) are a subset of high firm profits. Technically
speaking, the sufficiency of a combination of mecha-
nisms for observing high firm profits is shown if
membership scores in the proposed combination of
mechanisms are consistently less than or equal to the
membership in high firm profits, where consistency
“indicates how closely a perfect subset relation is
approximated” (Ragin, 2008: 44). With respect to suf-
ficiency, consistency is calculated as (Ragin, 2006a):
Consistency (XiYi) (min(Xi, Yi)) ⁄(Xi)
where Xi is the membership score of firm i in the
particular combination of mechanisms and Yi is
the membership score of firm i in the set of high
firm profits. Although a perfectly consistent subset
relation is desirable (i.e., consistency  1), a mini-
mum consistency of .80 is typically needed to es-
tablish that a consistent subset relation exists (e.g.,
see Greckhamer et al., 2013).
Sufficiency analyses are conducted by making
use of a truth table algorithm, which, in short, maps
the logically possible and empirically occurring
combinations of fuzzy sets under study (see Greck-
hamer et al., 2008; Ragin, 2000, 2008). This algo-
rithm requires the researcher to set a priori mini-
mum thresholds for consistency and the frequency
of cases per configuration. First, following Fiss
(2011), we set the minimum acceptable frequency to
three cases per configuration, but also sought to max-
imize this number while still ensuring that we had at
least 80% of the cases included in the analysis (see
Ragin, 2008; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). With respect to
consistency, our analytical procedure was as follows:
(1) we first identified all configurations (with three or
more cases) that had a minimum raw consistency
 .80; (2) from those configurations we eliminated
any that had a PRI consistency .75 (Ragin, 2006b);5
and (3) we then used the natural break in raw consis-
tency scores as the threshold consistency (e.g., Crilly,
2011; Fiss, 2011). We report the actual raw and PRI
consistencies, and frequency (and case inclusion rate)
used for each analysis in the footnotes of each table.
Finally, we used a minimum acceptable overall solu-
tion consistency of .80 (e.g., Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2011).
Before discussing the sufficiency results, it is
appropriate to make two additional explanatory
points. First, we report the intermediate solution
produced by the fsQCA software in configuration
tables and denote the presence and absence of gov-
ernance mechanisms within each configuration as
follows (e.g., Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2011): central con-
ditions are denoted by (present) and (absent)
while contributing conditions are represented by
(present) and (absent). Briefly, whether con-
ditions are considered central or peripheral is de-
termined by a counterfactual analysis facilitated by
the three different “solutions” produced in fsQCA
(i.e., the “complex,” “parsimonious,” and “inter-
mediate” solutions; for more detailed discussions,
see Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008). While the complex
solution shows the configuration(s) that are suffi-
cient for observing the outcome in the studied sam-
ple without any counterfactual analysis, the parsi-
monious and intermediate solutions show the
configurations that are sufficient for the outcome
based on the application of a counterfactual analy-
sis—an analysis incorporating the logically possi-
ble configurations for which no cases exist (these
configurations are called “remainders” in QCA ter-
minology). In short, those conditions in the parsi-
monious solution are denoted as core conditions
(as they withstand both “easy” and “difficult”
counterfactuals), while the intermediate solution
is simplified based on what the researcher would
assume or expect to occur if the remainders were
5 In addition to the raw consistency measure in the
truth table analysis, the fsQCA software reports a mea-
sure of PRI (“proportional reduction in inconsistency”),
which in essence is the consistency of the evidence for
the subset relation after eliminating the cases that are
consistent for both the presence and absence of the out-
come. Although the convention to date among QCA re-
searchers has been to simply rely on raw consistency in
conducting fuzzy set analyses, incorporating PRI consis-
tency into the analysis provides a more stringent ap-
proach (Ragin, 2006b). Thus, we do so here, and in set-
ting the minimum consistency thresholds for the current
study we follow the norms of extant research with re-
spect to raw consistency (0.80) and Ragin’s (2006b) sug-
gestions for PRI consistency (0.75).
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populated with cases (easy counterfactuals). It is
thus called “intermediate” because it stands be-
tween the parsimonious (both easy and hard coun-
terfactuals) and complex (no counterfactuals) solu-
tions, and is thus used to identify those
“contributing” (Ragin, 2008) or “peripheral” (Fiss,
2011) (contributing, hereafter) explanatory condi-
tions that could be removed from the solution but
only by applying “difficult” counterfactuals.
The key issue here then is that the researcher
must specify a priori the assumptions on which the
easy counterfactual analysis will be based. Given
that our analyses were exploratory in nature, we
conservatively made assumptions only for those
mechanisms for which extant theory is rather clear
that their presence should lead to high firm profits:
outside director independence, CEO ownership,
pressure-resistant external blockholdings, and an
active MCC. Existing theory for the remaining
mechanisms—outside director ownership (e.g.,
Dalton & Daily, 2001), CEO–TMT pay disparity
(e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001), TMT own-
ership (e.g., Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001), non-TMT
inside director ownership (e.g., Villalonga & Amit,
2006), CEO duality (e.g., Finkelstein & D’Aveni,
1994), CEO stock options (e.g., O’Connor, Priem,
Coombs, & Gilley, 2006)—suggests that no such
strong assumption should be made.
Second, we report the consistencies and cover-
ages for the overall solutions as well as for each
configuration (e.g., Fiss, 2011; Crilly, 2011). Solu-
tions contain several configurations (i.e., configu-
ration 1 or 2 or . . .) and raw coverage shows the
proportion of memberships in high firm profits that
are accounted for by each particular combination of
mechanisms. Raw coverage includes the overlap
among cases—cases may display multiple configura-
tions—and so unique coverage is the proportion of
membership in the outcome that is attributable only
to the particular configuration (Ragin, 2006a). In
short, coverage is a measure of empirical relevance
and unique coverage shows the relative importance
of each particular configuration (Fiss, 2011).
Our exploratory analyses proceeded as follows.
We first analyzed the sufficiency of the mecha-
nisms for high firm profits. Based on these initial
findings (this baseline solution is shown in Ta-
ble 2), we then further examined the substitutabil-
ity and complementarity of the various mecha-
nisms by exploring how they combine within
actors as well as across actors (and within and
across the various categories). These analyses in-
volved comparing a vast number of different com-
binations, and to do so we used the following three
criteria to assess model fit: empirical relevance (i.e.,
higher solution coverage is better), parsimony (i.e.,
fewer configurations are better), and content (i.e., we
had an eye toward capturing all of the empirically
relevant, qualitatively different configurations
that emerged across all of the analyses). Given the
enormity of the analyses and the limited space to
report them, rather than provide configuration
tables for each of the analyses we highlight our
key findings in the text and then report the over-
all best-fitting solution of all of the analyses (Ta-
ble 3). Finally, we examined the governance bun-
dle sufficient for the absence of high firm profits
(i.e., not-high profits).
RESULTS
The Sufficiency of the Governance Bundle for
High Firm Profits
Table 2 presents the configurations of gover-
nance mechanisms found to be sufficient for high
firm profits. In interpreting the solutions through-
out our analyses, we sought to understand: (1) the
qualitatively different configurations of gover-
nance mechanisms that result in high firm profits
among the cases; and (2) how the various mech-
anisms combine as substitutes and/or comple-
ments in constituting these configurations. While
both of these aspects of the interpretation were
integrally tied together, our focus in unpacking
the analyses and results is heavily on the latter.
Thus, we simply note at this point that a total of
six qualitatively different configurations of em-
pirical relevance emerged across all of the anal-
yses, four of which comprise the baseline solu-
tion presented in Table 2, and we sum up at the
end with an explanation of all six different con-
figurations that emerged from our analyses
(which are captured in Table 3).
Several insights into the substitutability and
complementarity of the mechanisms can be
gleaned by examining the patterns of mecha-
nisms across the configurations in Table 2. One is
that CEO incentive alignment mechanisms com-
plement rather than substitute for one another. At
least one form of CEO alignment mechanism is
present in all of the configurations, and in all but
one (configuration 3) the CEO has both substan-
tial ownership stakes (CEOown) and stock op-
tions (CEOoptions). Furthermore, this comple-
mentary relationship appears to differ with CEO
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duality: when a non-dual CEO is at the helm
(configurations 1a/1b, 2a/2b)6 both CEOown and
CEOoptions are central conditions when high prof-
its are obtained. Configurations 3 and 4 show, in
contrast, that when there is a dual CEO, CEOop-
tions are a central condition, with CEOown playing
a contributing role.
The configurations in Table 2 also show that all
the configurations involve some type of monitor-
ing. Several patterns with respect to how these
various monitoring mechanisms combine are evi-
dent. First, with respect to the monitoring by out-
side directors, independence (ODind) and substan-
tial ownership (ODown) generally complement
each other as their presence co-occurs (configura-
tions 1a/1b, 2a/2b, 3) in all but one scenario (con-
figuration 4). ODind clearly plays the central role
here, as ODown always appears as a contributing
6 Configurations 1a/1b and 2a/2b in Table 1 are “neu-
tral permutations” of each other, respectively, in that they
share the same central conditions and only differ in their
contributing conditions (e.g., Fiss, 2011: 398). Note also
that, not surprisingly, the “b” (1b/2b) configurations add no
unique coverage beyond the “a” (1a/2a) configurations.
TABLE 2
Governance Mechanisms Sufficient for Firm Profitsa,b,c
High Profit Solution
Not-High
Profit Solution
1a 1b 2a 2b 3 4 1 2
Internal Mechanisms
CEO Ownership (CEOown)
CEO Stock Options (CEOoptions)
Outside Director Independence (ODind)
Outside Director Ownership (ODown)
TMT Tournament (TMTtourn)
TMT Ownership (TMTown)
Non-TMT Inside Director Ownership
(nonTMT IDown)
CEO Duality
External Mechanisms
Blockholder (Blockhold)
Market for Corporate Control (MCC)
Consistency .87 .85 .84 .85 .89 .86 .80 .87
Raw Coverage .03 .03 .03 .04 .02 .02 .02 .01
Unique Coverage .01 0 .01 0 .01 .01 .02 .01
Overall Solution Consistency .86 .82
Overall Solution Coverage .10 .04
a Note: Central conditions are represented by (presence) and (absence); contributing conditions by (presence) and
(absence).
b Configurations 1a and 1b and 2a and 2b in the High Profits Solution are “neutral permutations,” respectively, in that they share the
same central conditions and only differ in their contributing conditions (see Fiss, 2011).
c Analyses minimum thresholds for the High Profit and Not-High Profit Solutions, respectively: raw consistency  .84, .82; PRI
consistency  .75, .76; frequency  3 cases/configuration (71% of sample on each).
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condition. Second, the two TMT mechanisms
(TMTtourn, TMTown), in contrast, appear as sub-
stitutes for one another as the presence of one is
generally accompanied by the absence of the
other (configurations 1a/1b, 2a/2b, 4), with their
absence only co-occurring in one scenario (config-
uration 3). Third, there also seems to be some type
of combinatorial relationship between ODind and
TMTtourn, as the one configuration in which
ODind is absent is also the one situation in which
the presence of TMTtourn appears as a central con-
dition (configuration 4).
Finally, the two external mechanisms also evi-
dently combine with each other, but they do so in
different ways when there is a non-dual CEO versus
a dual CEO. These two mechanisms complement
when there is a non-dual CEO: the presence of
pressure-resistant external blockholder(s) (Block-
hold) is the primary external mechanism that helps
to steer non-dual CEOs toward high firm profits,
and the MCC plays a contributing role (configura-
tions 1a/1b and 2a/2b). In contrast, it is the pres-
ence of an active MCC and the clear absence of
Blockhold that helps govern dual CEOs (configura-
tions 3 and 4).
Analyses of the Substitution and
Complementarity within Actors
Next, we further examined how the within-actor
mechanisms combined, by constructing meta-sets
(see Ragin, 2008) out of the two forms of CEO
incentives (CEOown, CEOoptions), the two outside
director mechanisms (ODown, ODind), and the two
TMT mechanisms (TMTown, TMTtourn). More
specifically, we combined each of these pairs of
mechanisms via the “fuzzy or” and the “fuzzy and”
operations. “Fuzzy or” uses the maximum value for
each case on the combined sets (i.e., the union),
and thus allowed us to examine whether the mech-
anisms serve as substitutes. For example, if ODind
and ODown substitute for one another, then either
one or the other only need be present for high firm
profits (ODown_or_ODind), and therefore it is only
the better score of the two that matters (i.e., one
could be in force while the other is absent).7 In
contrast, when mechanisms complement each
other, both mechanisms need to be present. This
can be captured via the “fuzzy and” operation (e.g.,
ODown_and_ODind), which takes the minimum
value (i.e., intersection) of the sets. While this does
not capture synergistic effects, it is nevertheless
conceptually consistent with complementarity:
both mechanisms need to be present when they are
complements, and thus the effect is subject to the
minimum of the two.
As noted above, in conducting these analyses we
used the baseline solution (see Table 2) to identify
those subsequent solutions that best fit the data
(i.e., solution coverage  .10; and whether subse-
quent analyses captured any empirically relevant
configurations beyond the four found in the base-
line solution). Rather than report the solutions in
table form we simply discuss the key findings in
the text.
We first examined a model in which all of the
within-actor combinations were entered as substi-
tutes (CEOown_or_CEOoptions, ODown_or_ODind,
TMTown_or_TMTtourn) and found no configura-
tions sufficient for high firm profits. The specified
model in which all of the mechanisms were comple-
ments (CEOown_and_CEOoptions, ODown_and_
ODind, TMTown_ and_TMTtourn) did yield a
solution, but its fit was inferior to the baseline
(coverage  .08).
We then examined model specifications in
which each of the particular pairs was entered sep-
arately as substitutes and then as complements.
The results confirmed that CEO incentives combine
as complements (coverage  .15) and not as substi-
tutes (coverage  .07).
With respect to outside directors, while model fit
exceeded the baseline both when ODind and
ODown were treated as complements and when
they were treated as substitutes (coverage  .13 for
both), the results continued to show that it was
only in the one scenario already found in the base-
line solution (configuration 4, Table 2) that the
absence of ODind (as a central condition) co-oc-
curred with the presence of ODown (as a contrib-
uting condition). In short, that ODind and ODown
serve as complements to each other remained evi-
dent after these analyses. Moreover, these results
suggest that ODown seems to operate as somewhat
of a necessity: its presence was found in every
configuration of every solution as a contributing
condition.
We also found that TMT mechanisms substitute
(coverage .13) rather than complement (coverage
.08) each other, and that it is the presence and ab-
7 In terms of notation, the “_or_” signifies that we
combined these mechanism via the “fuzzy or” operation,
i.e., fuzzyor(CEOown, CEOoptions) in fsQCA; we use
“_and_” to denote the “fuzzy and” operation.
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sence of TMTtourn that varies across configurations.
Indeed, the results showed that when TMTown plays
a role, it is its absence as a core condition that leads to
the obtainment of high profits.
Analyses of the Substitution and
Complementarity between Actors
The exploration of between-actor combinations
involved our examining how internal mechanisms
combine (OD mechanisms with TMT mechanisms),
how external mechanisms combine (Blockhold
with MCC), how internal and external mechanisms
combine (OD mechanisms with Blockhold and
with MCC; TMT mechanisms with Blockhold and
with MCC), and how the CEO incentive alignment
mechanisms combine with each of the respective
internal and external monitoring mechanisms. We
analyzed all of the possible combinations for each
of these pairings, examining individual mecha-
nisms as well as building on our previous findings.
That is, in comparing OD to TMT mechanisms, we
examined the combinations of each of the individ-
ual mechanisms (i.e., ODind and/or TMTtourn,
ODind and/or TMTown, ODown and/or TMTtourn,
etc.) as well as how they combined with the within-
actor combinations (i.e., ODind and/or TMTown_
or_TMTtourn, ODown and/or TMTown_or_TMTtourn,
ODind_or_ODown and/or TMTown_or_TMTtourn,
etc.). Again, our analytical procedure was guided
by fit (i.e., coverage/parsimony/content) and we
report here the key findings.
The analyses showed that the best fit with re-
spect to the OD mechanisms and TMT mechanisms
involves ODind and TMTtourn combining with
each other, and that they can either substitute (cov-
erage of .15) or complement (coverage of .12)
each other.
When it comes to the external mechanisms,
while the model fit met or exceeded the baseline
when Blockhold and MCC were treated as comple-
ments and as substitutes (coverages of .13 and .11,
respectively), the results continued to show that
they are complements in non-dual CEO situations
(Blockhold central; MCC contributing) and that the
absence of Blockhold and presence of MCC (both as
central conditions) govern dual CEOs.
With respect to how internal and external mech-
anisms combine, ODind combines with both Block-
hold and MCC: ODind can serve as either a substi-
tute for, or complement to, Blockhold (coverages of
.12 and .14, respectively), and combines similarly
with MCC: ODind can complement MCC (coverage
of .15) as well as substitute for it (coverage of .11).
As to TMT and external mechanisms, TMTtourn
only combines with MCC: we found that TMTtourn
can either complement (coverage of .14) or substi-
tute (coverage of .13) MCC. TMT mechanisms
do not, however, combine with Blockhold (all cov-
erages  .10).
The remaining comparisons involved examining
how the CEO incentive mechanisms combine with
the various internal and external mechanisms.
With regard to the latter, we found that CEO incen-
tives can serve in a complementary fashion to ei-
ther Blockhold or MCC (coverages of .12 and .13,
respectively) and do not substitute with either (cov-
erages of .06 and .03). Moreover, and following
from our findings with respect to the external
mechanisms already described above, the results
showed that this complementarity between CEO
incentives and external control is a function of CEO
duality. CEO incentives complement Blockhold
when there is a non-dual CEO, while they comple-
ment MCC when there is a dual CEO. Internally, we
found that the CEO incentive mechanisms com-
bined only with OD mechanisms and not with the
TMT mechanisms. In particular, the best-fitting
model involved CEO incentives and ODown as com-
plements (CEOown_and_CEOoptions_and_ODown;
coverage of .16).
The solution for this modeling is shown in Ta-
ble 3, which comprehensively captures the six dis-
tinctive empirically relevant configurations suffi-
cient for high firm profits that emerged from the
entirety of the analyses. In particular, configura-
tions 1a/1b and 2 of Table 3 correspond to the two
non-dual CEO scenarios shown in configurations
1a/1b and 2a/2b in Table 2, while configurations 4
and 5 in Table 3 represent the two dual CEO sce-
narios found in configurations 3 and 4 of Table 2.
We thus focus here on interpreting the two addi-
tional scenarios (configurations 3 and 6 of Table 3)
beyond the four already described in the baseline
analysis.
Configuration 3 (Table 3) shows a third way in
which non-dual CEOs are effectively governed: by
the presence of a non-TMT inside director with a
substantial stake (nonTMT IDown) along with a
compliant TMT (~TMTtourn;8 ~TMTown) but-
8 There are two things to note here. First, in Boolean
notation, the ~ signifies the absence of a condition, and
will be used hereafter. Second, while ~TMTtourn ap-
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tressed by CEO ownership, a vigilant board, and
both external control mechanisms. There are at
least two points worth noting with respect to this
configuration. First, while empirically relevant,
this scenario is a somewhat unusual governance
arrangement. As reported in the methods section,
only 124 of the 1,135 S&P 1500 firms under study
have a non-TMT inside director present on their
boards (and it is to this fact that the occurrence of
~non-TMT IDown as a contributing condition in all
of the other configurations can be attributed). More-
over, our analyses revealed that only seven of these
124 firms are effectively governed by the combina-
tion in configuration 3 of Table 3 (two are large-cap
firms, two mid-cap, three small-cap; all seven non-
TMT inside directors are the chairperson of the
board, six are ex-CEOs, two are founders, and one a
founder family member). Second, while the com-
plementary combination of CEO incentives and
ODown is shown in this particular configuration to
play no role, the analyses overall revealed that this
particular governance scenario involves the ab-
sence of CEOoptions and the presence of CEOown
and ODown (all as contributing conditions; thus,
they offset each other when combined here).
Configuration 6 of Table 3, then, shows a governance
scenario that applies to both non-dual and dual CEOs
alike. High profits are achieved when CEOs are
fully aligned (CEOown_and_CEOoptions), along
with ODind, ~TMTown, and ~MCC as central con-
ditions, and with ODown and ~nonTMT IDown as
contributing conditions. We also found that the
presence of TMTtourn and Blockhold can serve as
contributing or central conditions, depending on
the other combinations. Given this latter result, we
further investigated all cases that make up the con-
pears in configuration 3 of Table 3 as a contributing
condition, its absence also appears as a central condition
to this particular scenario in the other analyses.
TABLE 3
Governance Mechanisms Sufficient for High Firm Profits: Best-Fitting Solutiona,b
High Profit Solution
1a 1b 2 3 4 5 6
Internal Mechanisms
CEOown_and_CEOoptions_and_ODown
Outside Director Independence (ODind)
TMT Tournament (TMTtourn)
TMT Ownership (TMTown)
Non-TMT Inside Director Ownership (nonTMT IDown)
CEO Duality
External Mechanisms
Blockholder (Blockhold)
Market for Corporate Control (MCC)
Consistency .83 .85 .84 .81 .84 .82 .84
Raw Coverage .04 .04 .05 .01 .03 .05 .04
Unique Coverage .01 .00 .03 .01 .01 .02 .01
Overall Solution Consistency .83
Overall Solution Coverage .16
a Central conditions are represented by (presence) and (absence); contributing conditions by (presence)
and (absence).
b Analysis actual thresholds: raw consistency  .82; PRI consistency  .75; cases/configuration frequency  7 (87% of
sample).
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figurations in which TMTtourn appears—i.e., the
first non-dual CEO scenario (configuration 1a,
Table 2), the second dual CEO scenario (e.g.,
configuration 5, Table 3), and the scenario just
described (e.g., configuration 6, Table 3)—and
found a rather complex relationship between
ODind, TMTtourn, Blockhold, and MCC, one that
is contingent on the duality of the CEO. TMTtourn
combines with ODind, Blockhold, and MCC only
among non-dual CEOs. In contrast, TMTtourn com-
bines with ~ODind, ~Blockhold, and MCC only
when there is a dual CEO. The following combina-
tion then applies to both non-dual and dual
CEOs alike: TMTtourn, ODind, Blockhold, and
~MCC (all involved CEOown_and_CEOoptions
and ~TMTown as central conditions, with ODown
and ~nonTMT IDown contributing).
Summary of Findings for High Profits
While Table 3 provides an overview of the six
different configurations sufficient for high profits—
which, in short, entail three non-dual CEO scenar-
ios, two dual CEO scenarios, and one scenario
which applies regardless of CEO duality—Table 4
summarizes our findings with respect to the substi-
tutability and complementarity of the mechanisms
among these scenarios.
Our within-actor analyses found that the two CEO
incentive mechanisms (CEOown, CEOoptions) comple-
ment each other, that the two outside director mech-
anisms (ODind, ODown) tend to complement each
other, and that if anything, the two TMT mechanisms
(TMTtourn, TMTown) substitute rather than com-
plement one another. Moreover, the analyses show
that the presence of ODown is constant across all of
the configurations in which high firm profits are
obtained, while the absence of TMTown (as a core
condition) occurs in five of the six scenarios that
lead to high firm profits, and in the sixth scenario it
plays a diminished role at best.
The between-actor analyses found that, exter-
nally, the presence of pressure-resistant blockhold-
ers (Blockhold) works together with the threat of a
takeover (MCC), Moreover, the results clearly show
that how these external mechanisms combine is
related to CEO duality: they complement each
other in governing a non-dual CEO, whereas the
presence of MCC and the absence of Blockhold
help to govern a dual CEO for high profits to result.
Internally, board independence (ODind) appears
to work together with TMT tournament situations
(TMTtourn), but a full understanding of how they
combine when high profits are obtained requires
the external mechanisms as well as CEO duality
to be taken into account. In short, ODind and
TMTtourn complement each other when there is
also the presence of pressure-resistant Blockhold-
ings to govern non-dual CEOs (regardless of the
presence or absence of an active MCC) as well as to
effectively govern dual CEOs (only when there is a
clear absence of an active MCC). Otherwise, ODind
and TMTtourn substitute for one another.
Finally, the findings clearly suggest that CEO
incentives and monitoring mechanisms combine as
complements and not as substitutes. While CEO
incentives may be complemented by either external
mechanism, this complementarity is based on the
duality of the CEO: in the presence of a non-dual
CEO, CEO incentives and Blockholdings primarily
TABLE 4
Summary of Findings: Mechanisms as Substitutes or
Complements?a,b
Within-Actor Findings
CEO Incentive Alignment
CEO LT Contingent Pay (CEOoptions) Complements
CEO Ownership (CEOown)
Outside Directors
Independence (ODind) Complements
Equity Ownership (ODown)
TMT
Tournament (TMTtourn) Substitutes
Equity Ownership (TMTown)
Between-Actor Findings
Internal Monitoring Mechanism Combinations:
ODind/TMTtourn Substitutes and
Complementsc
External Monitoring Mechanism Combinations:
Blockholders (Blockhold)/Market for
Corporate Control (MCC)
Complementsd
Internal/External Monitoring Mechanism Combinations
ODind/TMTtourn/Blockhold/MCC Substitutes and
Complementse
CEO Incentives/Monitoring Mechanism Combinations:
CEOown/CEOoptions/ODown Complementsf
CEOown/CEOoptions/Blockhold Complementsg
CEOown/CEOoptions/MCC Complementsh
a When mechanisms can serve as both substitutes and com-
plements, the better-fitting solution is listed first.
b The summary here captures the general relationships found.
c See note (e) below.
d Note, however, that their relationship is a function of CEO
duality: they only complement each other when a non-dual CEO
is present. It is the presence of MCC and the absence of Block-
hold that governs dual CEOs.
e The relationship between ODind and TMTtourn is a com-
plex one that is a function of Blockhold, MCC, and CEO duality.
ODind and TMTtourn complement each other when there is also
the presence of Blockhold as well as either (1) a non-dual CEO
and an active MCC, or (2) the clear absence of MCC. Otherwise,
ODind and TMTtourn tend to substitute for one another.
f This combination yielded the best-fitting solution (see Ta-
ble 3).
g These serve as complements when there is a non-dual CEO.
h These serve as complements when there is a dual CEO.
1698 DecemberAcademy of Management Journal
enhance each other, whereas for dual CEOs, it is an
active MCC that complements CEO incentives (as
Blockholders are clearly absent). When it comes to
internal mechanisms, CEO incentives do not com-
bine with either TMT mechanism. CEO incentives
are complemented, however, by ODown. Indeed,
this simultaneity of CEO and outside director align-
ment yields the best-fitting solution.
The Sufficiency of the Governance Bundle for
Not-High Firm Profits
Qualitative comparative analysis typically in-
volves the examination of the sufficiency of the
explanatory conditions for the absence of the out-
come (e.g., Greckhamer et al., 2008; Ragin, 2008;
Rihoux & Ragin, 2009), which for the current study
meant that we also examined how the governance
mechanisms were sufficient for not-high firm prof-
its (i.e., the absence of high firm profits, or ~high-
ROA). The results of this analysis are shown in the
right panel of Table 2.9 There are two configura-
tions sufficient for not-high firm profits, one in-
volving non-dual CEOs (configuration 1) and the
other dual CEOs (configuration 2). Configuration 1
clearly shows that below-average firm profits result
when non-dual CEOs are governed only by the
presence of an independent board (all other mech-
anisms are clearly absent). Configuration 2 shows
another recipe for poor performance: a dual CEO,
an independent board, and a TMT member with a
substantial equity stake in the firm (and the clear
absence of all other mechanisms).
These findings with respect to not-high profits
further make it clear that monitoring without CEO
incentives does not work (at least, if high profits are
the goal). Moreover, in terms of monitoring, these
results clearly imply that simply having a non-dual
CEO and an independent board is not enough:
comparing the not-high profit configuration 1 to the
other non-dual CEO scenarios that lead to high
profits (i.e., Tables 2–3), it appears that an indepen-
dent board must also be buttressed by substantial
stakes among the outside directors, as well as a
pressure-resistant external blockholder (and in rel-
atively rare cases, a well-staked non-TMT inside
director). Furthermore, configuration 2 of the not-
high profits solution shows that TMT ownership
can be toxic: an independent board with no other
monitoring (or CEO incentive alignment) is no
match for a dual CEO along with a TMT member
with large equity stakes.
DISCUSSION
Prior research has typically treated corporate
governance mechanisms individually, and the evi-
dence to date on the effectiveness of any one mech-
anism is not encouraging. Some scholars have sug-
gested that understanding the effectiveness of
governance mechanisms requires delving into their
interdependencies in operating as a governance
bundle (Aguilera et al., 2008; Rediker & Seth, 1995).
Yet despite these and other calls for corporate gov-
ernance research to take a more holistic approach
(Dalton et al., 2003; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009: 258;
Tosi, 2008), we still know little of how governance
mechanisms operate together to afford firm profit-
ability. In the current study, we integrated the ex-
tant governance literature to specify the main
mechanisms that constitute the governance bundle,
and then used a qualitative comparative approach
to case analysis to examine whether the various
mechanisms substitute or complement each other,
as well as to distill the different combinations of
governance mechanisms sufficient for the presence
and absence of high profits. While our findings
provide a number of implications for researchers
interested in any one of the particular mechanisms,
our focus is decidedly on understanding how the
mechanisms work effectively together. Thus, while
in the following we touch on the key implications
of our findings with respect to individual mecha-
nisms, our aim here is to further elaborate theory
on combinations of governance mechanisms, both
between CEO incentive and monitoring mecha-
nisms, and across internal and external monitoring
mechanisms.
One of the main findings of our study is that CEO
incentives and monitoring mechanisms act as com-
plements. Past research has theorized that CEO in-
centives and monitoring either substitute for one
another (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Rediker & Seth,
1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1994) or complement each
other (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008; Milgrom & Roberts,
1992; Tosi, 2008); our findings suggest that they are
complements rather than substitutes. While our an-
alytical approach did not allow us to examine the
synergistic effects involved in complementarity per
9 We also conducted a similar analytical process with
not-high profits as the one described for high profits—
i.e., we examined different combinations of the various
mechanisms as either substitutes or complements—and
found no additional configurations beyond the ones
shown in Table 2.
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se, it nevertheless permitted an examination of
whether the relationships across mechanisms were
congruent with the notion of substitution (i.e., only
one or the other need be present for high firm
profits) or with complementarity (i.e., one and the
other need to be present). All six of the different
configurations leading to high profits found here
include at least one of the CEO alignment mecha-
nisms and at least one each of the internal and
external monitoring mechanisms. Indeed, our anal-
yses suggest that CEO incentives have a comple-
mentary relationship with outside director owner-
ship and with both of the external mechanisms,
and moreover, that these relationships are not sub-
stitutive. Furthermore, there is a clear absence of
the co-occurrence of CEO incentives and monitor-
ing when high profits are absent. Our findings
therefore lead us to formally posit that:
Proposition 1. The effectiveness of the gover-
nance bundle requires the presence of both
CEO incentive alignment and monitoring
mechanisms.
A second important contribution of our study is
that it clearly shows the fundamental role played
by the alignment of the other internal actors beyond
the CEO in the effectiveness of the governance bun-
dle. While prior research has primarily focused on
the alignment of CEOs, our study shows that the
firm equity stakes held by directors and the TMT
are consequential to governance effectiveness.
With respect to outside directors, our findings in-
dicate that outside directors’ ownership stakes act
much as a necessary condition for effective gover-
nance: their presence is a constant factor across all
of the different configurations sufficient for high
firm profits. Moreover, our analyses reveal that
board substantial ownership stakes complement
both CEO incentives and board independence
when high firm profits are obtained. Furthermore,
they show that such ownership stakes are clearly
absent when high profits are absent. Thus, our find-
ings extend prior research that has suggested out-
side directors’ ownership to be an important factor
in motivating them to perform their monitoring
duties effectively (e.g., Hambrick & Jackson, 2000):
while board independence is an important quality
of directors’ monitoring effectiveness, evidently it
is when such directors have substantial ownership
stakes in the firm that they fully exercise that qual-
ity. We propose therefore that:
Proposition 2. Outside directors holding a sub-
stantial investment of their own net worth in
the firm’s equity play an essential complemen-
tary role in the effectiveness of the governance
bundle: such ownership enhances the effec-
tiveness of director independence and of CEO
incentive alignment mechanisms.
Our findings make clear that TMT alignment
mechanisms also have a major effect on governance
effectiveness, but unlike with outside director own-
ership, the absence of TMT ownership stakes plays
a central role in our findings. Indeed, our findings
suggest that TMT tournament situations (i.e., when
there is a large pay disparity between CEO and
TMT members) can play a beneficial role in the
governance bundle—both the presence and the ab-
sence of a TMT tournament can lead to high prof-
its—and that not having anyone on the TMT with a
substantial ownership stake is of importance for
effective governance. Moreover, when the TMT
ownership stakes combine with a dual CEO and an
independent board but no other governance mecha-
nisms, this can be quite toxic, as this combination
was sufficient for observing the absence of high prof-
its. Our results therefore contribute to the long-run-
ning debate on whether or not a pay disparity be-
tween the CEO and the top executives is beneficial to
firm performance (e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson,
2001)—it evidently can be beneficial—but also sug-
gest that future research is very much needed to de-
velop an understanding of why TMT ownership
stakes are so detrimental to the obtainment of high
firm profits. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that
TMT alignment mechanisms play a fundamental role
in the governance bundle, and more specifically, lead
to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. TMT tournaments may lend to
the effectiveness of the governance bundle,
while TMT members (other than the CEO)
holding substantial equity stakes lend to the
ineffectiveness of the governance bundle.
Another set of major implications come from our
findings with respect to how the multiple internal
and external mechanisms that comprise the gover-
nance bundle operate together. Internally, we
found that monitoring by boards combines with
mutual monitoring among managers: board inde-
pendence is complementary to a TMT tournament
in some situations, while in others these two mech-
anisms substitute for one another for high profits.
Externally, we found that the relationship between
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pressure-resistant blockholders and the threat of a
takeover (MCC) is a function of CEO duality when
high profits are obtained: these external control
mechanisms tend to complement each other in the
absence of CEO duality, yet dual CEOs tend to be
governed effectively by the threat of a takeover and
the absence of pressure-resistant blockholders.
With respect to how internal and external mecha-
nisms combine, our analyses reveal that a rather
complex relationship exists between board inde-
pendence, TMT tournaments, blockholders, and
the MCC, and show, moreover, that CEO duality
plays a role in the way these four mechanisms
combine when high profits are obtained. Very sim-
ply put, while board independence and TMT tour-
naments can either complement or substitute for
one another in governing both dual and non-dual
CEOs, effective governance of non-dual CEOs re-
quires the additional presence of a pressure-resis-
tant external blockholder (with the MCC playing
back-up), whereas dual CEOs tend to be governed by
an active MCC and the absence of pressure-resistant
external blockholdings. Additionally, our findings
suggest that when there is a non-TMT inside director
(e.g., ex-CEO, founder) with a substantial equity stake
present (along with a vigilant board, compliant TMT,
and both external mechanisms contributing support),
effective governance involves a non-dual rather than
a dual CEO. In short, our findings suggest that at least
one of the internal mechanisms and one of the exter-
nal mechanisms are part of effective governance, as
well as that monitoring mechanisms within each of
these broad categories (i.e., internal, external) can
combine in the simultaneity of substitution and com-
plementarity. Thus, we offer the following two gen-
eral propositions:
Proposition 4. The effectiveness of the gover-
nance bundle involves internal and external
monitoring mechanisms working together as
complements.
Proposition 5. The effectiveness of the gover-
nance bundle involves the simultaneity of sub-
stitution and complementarity among the var-
ious monitoring mechanisms.
A final major implication of our study is that
having a non-dual CEO does not guarantee success;
that is, we found that the effectiveness of the gov-
ernance bundle can occur either when the CEO is
also the chairperson of the board (CEO duality) or
when these roles are separated (non-dual CEO).
Across the six qualitatively different configurations
sufficient for high profits revealed by our analyses,
three involve a non-dual CEO, two of them a dual
CEO, and one configuration applies regardless of
CEO duality. In addition to the general pattern
across dual and non-dual CEOs described above—
that pressure-resistant blockholders or a non-TMT
inside director owner are part of the governance
bundle when there is a non-dual CEO, but such
ownership control is not part of the mix when there
is a dual CEO—the two configurations found to be
sufficient for the absence of high profits included
one involving CEO duality and the other a non-dual
CEO. These latter results clearly suggest that sim-
ply combining a non-dual CEO with an indepen-
dent board (i.e., with all other incentive and mon-
itoring mechanisms absent) is not the recipe for
governance success. Low profits also occur when a
dual CEO is accompanied by a TMT member hold-
ing substantial equity stakes and is otherwise con-
fronted only by an independent board (i.e., all of
the other incentive and monitoring mechanisms are
absent). In short, our findings make it quite clear
that separating the CEO and chairperson roles as a
simple recipe for governance success, a key notion
of agency theory, is not an adequate prescription.
Furthermore, while our findings extend organiza-
tional theory suggestions that CEO duality is bene-
ficial, things are not quite so straightforward on this
account either. In short, our findings show that
effective (and ineffective) governance can result
under the leadership of either a dual or a non-dual
CEO, and the result depends on how this leader-
ship structure combines with the other governance
mechanisms.
Proposition 6. The separation of the CEO and
board chairperson roles does not lend to the
effectiveness of the governance bundle, per se.
Instead governance effectiveness rests on how
CEO (non)duality combines with the other
mechanisms comprising the bundle.
Of course, our findings, and thus the relation-
ships we have proposed here, are subject to the
limitations of our study. First, our conceptual spec-
ification of the essential mechanisms of the gover-
nance bundle is based on the extant literature, and
we have judiciously attempted to capture each of
these elements, including incentive and monitor-
ing, and internal and external, mechanisms. Never-
theless, future research that probes more deeply
into particular elements of the bundle is certainly
warranted. For instance, it would be interesting to
delve more fully into board structural arrange-
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ments, i.e., combinations of the qualities (indepen-
dence, ownership) of the directors or chairs com-
prising the various committees (nominating,
compensation, audit) that have been deemed to be
critical to board functioning in recent legislation
(e.g., SOX). More nuanced research could also ex-
amine the workings of external mechanisms, such
as how firm entrenchment practices (e.g., “poison
pills”) thwart the market for corporate control. It is
worth noting, however, that any such research—
our study included—is constrained by the fact that
the complexity of configurational analysis puts a
limit on the number of explanatory conditions that
can be included in any one set of analyses (see
Greckhamer et al., 2013).
A second limitation of our study is that we
did not incorporate any of the firm-level (e.g., firm
size; Rediker & Seth, 1995) or industry-level (e.g.,
dynamism; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998) contingen-
cies that have previously been suggested to affect
the operation of governance mechanisms, nor did
we consider the national systems within which the
governance bundle operates (e.g., Aguilera et al.,
2012). Therefore, future research that examines
how such contingency conditions, and others, in-
fluence the workings of governance mechanisms
should prove fruitful. Furthermore, while we pur-
posely studied the S&P 1500 firms due to their
prominence in the U.S. economy and their range in
terms of size, future research will have to deter-
mine how the governance bundle operates among
other populations of firms (i.e., smaller firms, IPOs,
international firms, etc.).
Third, given the in-depth exploration of our case
analytical approach, we focused on one indicator of
firm performance—firm profits as captured by
ROA—as such accounting-based measures are
more objective than are market-based measures
(i.e., shareholder returns) or hybrid measures (i.e.,
Tobin’s Q). Market-based measures (and thus hy-
brid measures) capture profits as well as market
perceptions and future-oriented growth (see Fryx-
ell & Barton, 1990). Indeed, though Tobin’s Q is
often used as a measure of performance in gover-
nance studies, it is also widely used as a measure of
growth opportunities rather than performance (e.g.,
Gaver & Gaver, 1995; Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales,
2000). Furthermore, because accounting- and mar-
ket-based measures differ in their orientation (the
former are historical/objective, the latter future/
perceptual; again, see Fryxell & Barton, 1990), it is
very likely that different combinations of mecha-
nisms will yield high (and not-high) market-based
performance. Thus, future research that examines
such performance outcomes is clearly warranted.
A final caveat has to do with the issues of cau-
sality and endogeneity. Although conceptually our
arguments assume causality (i.e., that governance
mechanisms lead to high profits), our cross-sec-
tional inquiry, and configurational approach more
generally, do not allow for claims of causality, nor
do they help to rule out any potential reverse causal-
ity among the relationships. For instance, Demsetz
and colleagues (e.g., Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz
& Villalonga, 2001) have suggested that the relation-
ship between ownership structure and performance
is an endogenous one. Furthermore, prior research is
also suggestive of the possible endogeneity between
firm performance and CEO duality (Finkelstein &
D’Aveni, 1994). Although we used a lagged design,
the set-theoretic methodology is not yet equipped to
resolve these issues, and thus future configurational
research that addresses this issue is needed.
Despite these limitations, our configurational ap-
proach to examining the bundle of governance
mechanisms that operates to constrain managers
effectively to the pursuit of profits helps advance
theory on corporate governance as a bundle of
mechanisms. Overall, our findings suggest that the
governance bundle is not simply driven by equilib-
rium and efficiency tradeoffs, as surmised by the
substitution perspective. Instead, effectiveness ap-
pears to be heavily reliant on the mechanisms mu-
tually enhancing each other in a complementary
manner. Our study suggests that CEO incentive
alignment and monitoring mechanisms work to-
gether as complements rather than as substitutes.
Furthermore, our findings show that some form of
internal and external monitoring mechanisms must
be present. At the same time, however, monitoring
mechanisms combine in complex ways such that
there may be simultaneity of substitution and com-
plementarity among and across the various moni-
toring and control mechanisms. Finally, our find-
ings make evident that the two mechanisms largely
held as “silver bullets” for the governance prob-
lem—board independence and CEO non-duality—
are not in and of themselves solutions. Their effec-
tiveness lies in how they combine with the other
mechanisms that constitute the governance bundle.
Indeed, our findings clearly show that CEO duality
may be just as beneficial to firm profitability as is
the separation of the CEO and chairperson roles.
In conclusion, future researchers and policy
makers would do well to take a more configuration-
al approach, in terms of how they think about,
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design, and study corporate governance. To truly
understand governance effectiveness, we must stop
thinking about the mechanisms in isolation, give
up the search for the end-all mechanism(s), and
instead direct attention to how the various gover-
nance mechanisms combine effectively with each
other for the particular outcomes desired.
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